DECENTRALISED FINANCE: The DeFi – CeFi – TradFi nexus

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- CeFi, DeFi, TradFi and why do we care?
- International efforts for crypto regulation
- DLT-based finance: Tokenisation of assets
- The CBDC angle



OECD Committee on Financial Markets Reports

- Why Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Matters and the Policy Implications (Jan 2022) <u>OECD Report</u>
- Institutionalisation of crypto and DeFi/TradFi interconnectedness (May 2022) <u>OECD Report</u>
- Lessons from the crypto winter: DeFi versus CeFi OECD Report
- Environmental impact of digital assets OECD Report

Past OECD work on Tokenisation of Assets

- The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Financial markets (2019 report)
- Regulatory approaches to the tokenisation of assets (2020 report)

Forthcoming work on CBDCs

CBDCs and Democratic Values (forthcoming)







The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Financial Markets Regulatory Approaches to the Tokenisation of Assets







CRYPTO, STABLECOINS, DEFI – WHY DO WE CARE



Why do we care?

- Speed of growth of these markets (before the crypto-winter)
 - Highly-volatile markets with feedback loops between them
- Activity operating in non-compliant manner or outside the regulatory perimeter
- Disproportionately affected retail investors
- Increased professional and institutional investor interest
 - Driven by speculation, FOMO and opportunities for unrestricted leverage
 - Risks of growing interconnectedness DeFi TradFi -> future financial stability implications



Total Value Locked (TVL) in ETH-based DeFi



Market capitalisation of major crypto-assets





Anonymity and lack of AML/KYC

Pseudonymity and onboarding

Regulatory and Compliance

- > Non-compliant or outside the remit
- > Difficult to identify regulatory access points
- > Global reach with no defined jurisdiction

Operational

- DLT-related operational risks
- > Cyber, hacks
- > Exploits



Investor and consumer protection

- > Lack of investor protection safeguards (e.g., no recourse/recovery/resolution)
- > Difficult to grasp for average user (e.g., automated liquidation)

Governance

- > Accountability
- Market manipulation

Systemic

- Pro-cyclicality, leverage
- Liquidity and maturity mismatches
- > Risks related to major stablecoins
- Concentration risks (tech, protocols)





Source: CoinMarketCap, DeFiLlama, CoinMetrics, Thomson Reuters Eikon as of 20 February 2023; declaration of John J. Ray III in support of Chapter 11 petitions https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/FTXFILING.pdf.

The important role of stablecoins as the key bridge DeFi-TradFi

- Important linkage point to TradFi at > USD 140bn
 - Reserve assets = traditional financial assets (for non algo)

Uses in decentralised finance markets:

- To move between crypto-assets or crypto-exchanges
- As collateral pledged on DeFi lending/ liquidity mining
- To hedge crypto-asset volatility without having to convert to fiat and/or exit DeFi

Risks related to:

- Concentration
- Transparency around reserves / credibility of reporting
- Lack of clarity regarding redemption rights of holders
- Operational risks and disruption related to cyber
- Run risk ('breaking the buck', insufficient liquidity of reserve assets)
- \Rightarrow Potential spillovers to traditional markets (e.g. short-term credit)



Stablecoin issuance (USD bn)

But also as a double-edged sword for DeFi

- Stablecoins are one of the foundational basis of DeFi
- but also one of the greatest points of vulnerability of the DeFi market

USDC case study (April 23):

- Circle held 8% of its USD40 bn in reserves at the failing lender Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) (c. USD 3.3bn)
 → USDC broke its peg
- Subsequently, DAI also lost its peg
 - DAI collateralised by USDC as reserves
- => Risk of disruption in DeFi markets

Circle's USDC de-pegging at SVB's implosion



An opaque, heavily intertwined market



Source: OECD (2022) Lessons from the crypto-winter: DeFi vs. CeFi, as of September 2022.



EFFORTS FOR CRYPTO REGULATION (BEYOND MICA)



Japan's Regulatory Framework for Crypto-assets and Stablecoins

		Issuers	Intermediaries
"Digital-money type stablecoins"	 Issued at a price linked to the value of fiat Promising redemption at par 	 Banks Fund transfer service provider Trust companies 	 Electronic payment exchange service provider
"Crypto- assets"		 Issuers could be regulated as "Crypto Asset Exchange Service Providers" when they distribute crypto assets by themselves. 	 Crypto Asset Exchange Service Providers
"Electronically recorded transferrable rights"		 Issuers are subject to disclosure requirements and are regulated as "Type 2 Financial Instruments Business Operators" if they solicit the acquisition of tokens on their own. 	 Type 1 Financial Instruments Business Operators



Korean framework for crypto-assets and stablecoins (in progress)

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Current Stage			Next Stage	
Policy	Status	Authority	Main contents	 Regulations on: Virtual asset issuance/ distribution systems Stablecoins (including security tokens and utility tokens) Business behaviors of
Measure to Overhaul Regulations of Security Tokens	February 6, 2023	FSC	 Overhaul regulatory system on the issuance and circulation of security tokens in order to allow STOs within the regulatory scope of the FSCMA 	
Virtual Asset Investor Protection Act*	The National Policy Committee voted to pass on May 11, 2023	 Explicitly separates CBDCs from the definition of virtual assets Protects customer assets and prohibiting unfair trade 	 Improvement measures for the FIU to AML 	
		FSS, BOK	 Requests data from VASPs Complies with obligations of virtual asset operators 	According to BOK, South Korea would
* For the 1 st pha	their reference			

* For the 1st phase, and the 2nd phase complemented market order regulations such as the issuance and disclosure of virtual assets



THE MISSING LINK:

DEFI

DeFi: theoretical premise and current market



Public, permissionless chains



PROTOCOLS RELYING ON SMART CONTRACTS



Programmable contracts written as code on the ledger committed to the blockchain Self-executing based on triggers

Open source and Community-driven



Non-Custodial





NON- CUSTODIAL:

Users have 100%

control over their

crypto, owners hold

their private keys &

data

CUSTODIAL: Third parties (exchanges, brokers) hold and have control over users' crypto

Composable



In reality, DeFi today is "Decentralised in Name Only" (DINO)

Source: OECD (1022). Why Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Matters and the Policy Implications



In reality, DeFi today is "Decentralised in Name Only" (DINO)

- Ability to change the protocol
- Identifiable controlling entities
 - Governance and tokenholdings
 - Developers with admin keys
 - Any affiliated entities with controlling influence
- Entities receiving rents
 - "Follow the money"

AND, some additional considerations

- How do we treat smart contracts? (liability)
- Liability for operational resilience and risk mitigation
- Reporting obligations



DLT-BASED FINANCE: TOKENISATION OF ASSETS



The case for asset tokenisation and some risks

Potential benefits

- ✓ Potential benefits of speed and costs (disintermediation)
- ✓ Fractional ownership
- ✓ Transparency (e.g. record of beneficial ownership)
- ✓ Faster and cheaper repo and securities lending

Potential downside

- Shift away from market-making means no shock absorber
- Bifurcation of liquidity for assets traded both on- and off-chain
- DLT-related operational risks

Clearing and atomic settlement \rightarrow *killer app*, insofar as there is a tokenised version of fiat for payment leg

- ✓ Streamlined, cheaper and faster data reconciliation, shortened settlement cycle (programmable no need for instantaneity)
- ✓ No netting need
- ✓ Lower counterparty risks
- ✓ Reduced asset encumbrance for assets pledged as collateral for margin



If it's so good, why has it not taken off yet?

LIMITATIONS

- * Tokenisation **meaningful** only in markets where:
 - Measurable efficiency gains to be reaped (high complexity of process, multiple levels of intermediation, low speed and high costs); or
 - Deficiency of trust

As such, wider adoption more likely for illiquid assets in niche small markets -> Private securities/ SME financing

- e.g. private placements of non-listed securities/ other SME securities, and PE/VC funds; real estate
- * Lack of incentives in highly efficient markets
 - · e.g. incremental benefit in US equities is small to justify overall investment
- Need for a whole ecosystem change
- Important legal limitations
 - Ownership of token does not always accord ownership of underlying asset
 - Legal enforceability of smart contracts
 - Settlement finality probabilistic
 - Possible need for trusted verifying authority (enhanced custody) (e.g. Lichtenstein)
 - Interoperability, registries, property rights and custodians
 - + Safe Tokenised form of money was until recently absent



Payment leg in atomic DvP (delivery versus payment)



Atomic DvP ensures the securities are delivered if and only if payment is performed

Advantages of CBDCs vs. stablecoins

- $\checkmark\,$ Limit the risks associated with the use of stablecoins, such as run risk
 - ✓ Avoid systemic stress from potential failure of entities issuing dominant stablecoins, and spill-over
- ✓ Safer settlement of transactions
 - ✓ Limited, if not absent, counterparty risk
- ✓ Promotes safety, trust and certainty of execution

 $Chart\ Source:\ https://www.banque-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-banque-de-france.fr/en/wholesale-central-bank-digital-currency-experiments-bank-digital-currency-experiments-bank-digital-currency-experiments-bank-digital-curency-experiments-bank-digital-currency-experiments-bank-digi$

- ✓ Near real-time settlement and certain delivery in securities transactions
- ✓ The securities transacted and corresponding payments switch ownership simultaneously
- For the payment to be exchanged without the lengthy processing times or costly fees involving intermediaries off-thechain, a tokenised version of currency is required for the payment leg of the transaction
 - Stablecoins
 - CBDCs
 - Tokenised deposits
 - Linkages to existing payment infrastructure (e.g., through APIs)



CONCLUSION





- Great progress is being made
 - Regionally (MiCA) or at national level (e.g. Japan, Korea)
 - At global level (FSB framework of high-level recommendations that promote coordinated and effective regulation, supervision and oversight and address financial stability risks)
- Digital assets and decentralised finance are inherently global by nature
- \rightarrow Need for international cooperation
- \rightarrow Consistency between regulatory action will be critical
 - No one jurisdiction can address these risks without global coordination (e.g., crypto-asset mining)
- Still, we should not overlook potential benefits:
- What can we learn from decentralised finance to capture potential efficiencies and allow for productivity gains in financial market infrastructure?
 - Atomic settlement and/or post-trade
 - Smart contracts and automation, programmability, encryption
 - Tokenisation
- New frontiers: emergence of CBDCs and other tokenised forms of money (regulated stablecoins, tokenised deposite

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